IGF-UA 2024 (15th Ukrainian Internet Governance Forum) — In-Depth Report: Minutes Digest & 3-Line Summary

The 3-Line Summary

The 15th Ukrainian IGF (IGF-UA 2024) ran 27–29 November 2024 in hybrid form — a protected site in Kyiv plus videoconference. A 9.5-hour air alert preceded the opening and a rocket attack left just 2 hours of electricity, yet all eight sections were completed.
The SBU reported building a world-first legal precedent: prosecuting Russian cyberattacks as war crimes before the International Criminal Court. Year-three wartime issues dominated — the telecom staffing crisis and conscription reservations, the slowing advance of Ukrainian online, and traffic re-routing in occupied territories.
Sustaining dialogue on backup power through alerts and blackouts made the forum itself a working case of wartime internet governance — with threads leading to the UN's WSIS+20 review and preparation for ICANN's new gTLD round.

Welcome — this is the Japan IGF Support Organization. This in-depth report on IGF-UA 2024 (15th Ukrainian Internet Governance Forum) draws on official outputs, session records and on-site reporting. In a hurry? The three lines above and the diagrams carry the gist.

Conference at a Glance (from official records)

Item	Detail
Official name	IGF-UA 2024 (15th Ukrainian Internet Governance Forum)
Edition	15th edition
Dates	27–29 November 2024
Venue	Hybrid — a secure 'point of invincibility' on the Adamant company site in Kyiv, plus videoconference
Theme	Regional governance themes
Host	Internet Association of Ukraine (InAU), Commission on Science and IT of the USPP and the NGO European Media Platform, supported by the parliamentary Digital Transformation Committee, the electronic-communications regulator, the State Language Commissioner and ICANN, sponsored by RIPE NCC and the IGF Supporting Association

(See the source list at the end of this article.)

Discussion Digest — from the Session Records

Key exchanges extracted from session records and transcripts.

1. Convening Through a 9.5-Hour Air Alert — The Operation Itself as Proof of Resilience

Sessions: Forum operations overall (annual report, Introduction)

The night before the opening, an air-raid alert in Kyiv lasted 9.5 hours; after the next day's rocket attack, electricity was available for only 2 hours. The secured Adamant site and energy backup kept the forum running without interruption [1]
Most participants connected by videoconference, with online broadcast and automatic Ukrainian/English subtitles; 'security measures and energy backup proved to be justified,' the official report records [1]

2. Cyberattacks as War Crimes — The SBU's Path to the International Criminal Court

Sessions: Section 1 'Cybersecurity and War: Protection of State Information Resources and Systems' (mod. Ivan Pietukhov)

SBU representatives reported that investigating and documenting Russian cyberattacks on Ukraine is creating a world-first legal precedent for their recognition as war crimes by the International Criminal Court, with evidence being prepared for transfer to the ICC [1]
The section warned of 'Black Hat AI' — terrorist groups or totalitarian states combining botnets with AI — as a potential existential threat, calling for 'White Hat AI' countermeasures built on international cooperation, legal regulation and strict security standards [1]
An active cyber-defence strategy based on NIST standards and the election commission's system readiness for post-war elections were cited as positive examples, while draft laws 8087 and 11290 were criticised for importing totalitarian norms under the guise of martial law and European integration [1]

3. The Telecom Staffing Crisis — Conscription Reservations and Frontline Providers

Sessions: Section 2 'Reservation of Conscripts for the Electronic Communications Sector and Workforce Deficit' (mod. Olena Kushnir, InAU)

The section centred on 'bronyuvannya' — reserving essential telecom engineers from mobilisation — with the Digital Ministry, parliament and frontline businesses comparing practice under the government resolution amended on 22 November 2024 [1]
Sumy provider PSTS, an operator from Kramatorsk in Donetsk region and Atracom's HR chief described the realities of reservation applications for frontline and backbone providers and problems with conscription offices [1]
An initiative was put to MP Oleksandr Fedienko to convene a roundtable of industry associations, the Digital Ministry and the Defence Ministry, with a designated Defence Ministry contact for the sector [1]

4. Ukrainian Online — A Warning That Momentum Is Slowing

Sessions: Section 4 'Problems of the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language on the Internet' (mods. Serhiy Syrotenko, State Language Commissioner's Secretariat / Serhiy Stukanov)

Comparative research showed the growth in Ukrainians choosing Ukrainian online has slowed sharply, with declines in posting language on Instagram and TikTok — and online use lagging significantly behind offline, real-life use [1]
Russian retains a strong position in the interface language of popular online services and software, in video consumption, and in search queries and Google recommendations [1]
Participants agreed on four workstreams: engaging major IT companies to fix algorithmic biases favouring Russian, creating investment conditions for Ukrainian localisation, corporate policies nudging users toward Ukrainian, and raising digital literacy [1]

5. Internet, Human Rights, War — Documenting Violations and Taking Them Global

Sessions: Sections 5 'Internet, Human Rights, War', 6 'European and International IG Initiatives' and 7 'New gTLD Round' (mod. Oksana Prykhodko, European Media Platform)

Beyond destroyed access and energy infrastructure and killed or injured professionals, the re-routing of internet traffic in occupied territories via Russia is being documented as evidence of digital human-rights violations; the database 'is increasing every day' but cannot yet be shared openly, and disappointment was voiced that some international platforms fail to respond adequately [1]
The 2024 Global Digital Compact, NetMundial+10 and the 2025 WSIS+20 review were surveyed, noting that no internet-governance agreement is binding and that official translations conflating 'multistakeholder' with 'multilateral' distort the debate [1]
For ICANN's new gTLD round opening in 2026, fee discounts (from $227,000 to $30–50,000) and whether applications can come from temporarily occupied Ukrainian territories were flagged as practical issues for 2025 [1]

Three-Minute Short Talk — Your Questions Answered

Q. Under what conditions was it held?

A. A 9.5-hour air alert the night before opening, and only 2 hours of electricity after a rocket attack during the forum — yet the secured site and backup power carried all three days through.

Q. What was the most historic report?

A. The SBU's work to have Russian cyberattacks recognised as war crimes by the International Criminal Court — the first attempt anywhere to prosecute cyberattacks as war crimes.

Q. Why should I care?

A. How international law treats cyberattacks matters to every country's security debate, and keeping networks and their engineers running through emergencies is a lesson far beyond Ukraine.

What Is Ukraine IGF? (for first-time readers)

Ukraine IGF is a National or Regional IGF Initiative (NRI), aligning local internet governance discussion with global IGF principles.

Why It Matters to You

What was discussed here becomes the baseline for national digital policy, platform rules and AI regulation worldwide within a few years. The principles confirmed at the 2024 meeting are the foundation of the "next rules" for the phones, social platforms and AI services you use every day.