日本語版: 金融インフラが止まる日 ― 不正アクセス事案のサジェスト推移・株価と、セキュリティ投資の一般論(速報版)
Also published on Site Scouter and Egosaru.
A VPS service used to run automated FX trading went offline, and its users were asked to back up their data, unplug their PCs and power them off. On the first trading day after the operator confirmed that customer data had been taken (Notice No. 4, 24 October), the parent company’s share price fell by more than 15%. This article records the sequence of events from public sources only, follows how search suggestions and share prices moved, and, separately from the still-unpublished cause of this incident, sets out what under-investing in security can cost any operator. This is a flash edition; the figures will be updated every business day (see the update history at the end). Press reports say that after the 27 October deadline the attacker published one item of what appears to be personal data and announced daily publications at noon (authenticity unknown; see section 1).
1. What happened (public information as of 17:00 JST, 2 November 2026)
The service is “Onamae.com Desktop Cloud”, a Windows VPS offered by GMO Internet, Inc. for running MT4/MT5 expert advisors (automated FX trading) around the clock. Up to 26,739 servers may be affected. The timeline below is limited to what the company has published and what has been reported. The cause (the intrusion route) is not stated in the official documents as of 17:00 on 2 November (what was said at the 2 November press conference is confirmed from press reports).
| Date | Fact | Source (checked 2026-11-02) |
|---|---|---|
| 19 Oct | Investigation started after customer inquiries | GMO Notice No. 2 (22 Oct): https://group.gmo/info/alert/20261022/ |
| 20 Oct | Unauthorized programs found on some customer servers. New sign-ups and the control panel suspended | Same; Notice No. 1 (21 Oct): https://www.onamae.com/news/article/11584 |
| 21 Oct, 04:00 | Servers for all plans shut down in sequence to contain the damage (still offline). Notice No. 1 published | Same |
| 22 Oct | Notice No. 2: login credentials for trading tools stored on servers may have been obtained and misused by a third party. Police consulted | GMO Notice No. 2 |
| 24 Oct | Notice No. 4: customer data confirmed taken outside the company. The company says it has received a ransom demand and threats to publish data, continue unauthorized orders at more than 70 securities and FX firms, and run ransomware (the content of the threats is unverified); it will not pay. Announces a flat 5,000-yen payment to every customer, compensation for realized losses from unauthorized trades, and six months of a replacement environment free of charge. Asks the government to apply “active cyber defense” measures | GMO Notice No. 4: https://group.gmo/info/alert/20261024/; Impress Watch: https://internet.watch.impress.co.jp/docs/news/2150991.html |
| 25 Oct | CEO Masatoshi Kumagai publishes a blog post: internal white-hat hackers had flagged improvement items in advance; the depth and speed of the response were insufficient; the operations team had weighed availability and other priorities. States that the company has not accepted, and has not paid, a demand of about 8 billion yen (USD 50 million) | Kumagai’s blog: https://www.kumagai.com/?eid=19600; GMO notice: https://group.gmo/info/alert/20261025/; ASCII: https://ascii.jp/elem/000/004/445/4445544/; ITmedia: https://www.itmedia.co.jp/news/article/2610/26/2000002571/ |
| 26 Oct | On the Tokyo Stock Exchange, GMO Internet Group (9449) closes at 3,179 yen, down 590 yen (about 16%) from the previous Friday. GMO Internet (4784) closes at 418 yen, down 73 yen | Nikkei: https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXZQOUB267FQ0W6A021C2000000/; Reuters: https://news.infoseek.co.jp/article/26reutersJAPAN_KCN3W50XR/ |
| 26 Oct | A party claiming to be the attacker announces it will publish customer data and launch ransomware against customer PCs at noon on 27 October (the amount demanded on the attacker’s site is reported as about USD 1 million). GMO asks users to back up their data before the deadline, unplug their PCs and power them off. Employees visit customers’ homes to collect devices, which the company’s white-hat team is analysing | Impress Watch (27 Oct): https://www.watch.impress.co.jp/docs/news/2151375.html; ITmedia (27 Oct): https://www.itmedia.co.jp/news/article/2610/27/2000002610/; NHK (27 Oct): https://news.web.nhk/newsweb/na/nd-20261027de66048 |
| 27 Oct, 11:59 | Notice No. 9: of the devices collected, those analysed so far show no malware (including ransomware), though the company says this does not confirm the safety of every customer’s device. Customers whose PCs were hit by ransomware will, after verification, be given a new PC of equivalent performance. Security and AI companies, including Trend Micro, have offered help | GMO Notice No. 9: https://group.gmo/info/alert/2026102702/; ITmedia (27 Oct, 14:10): https://news.yahoo.co.jp/articles/0283cbd8ebb5bf1d2323257f562205aa11d7df65 |
| 27 Oct, 12:00 | The attacker’s stated deadline. GMO maintains that it will not pay | NHK (updated 12:20, 27 Oct) |
| 27 Oct, afternoon | Press reports that the attacker, saying GMO had not negotiated by the deadline, published on a Japanese-language site one item of what appears to be personal data (including a name and phone number). Its authenticity is unknown. In a new statement the attacker says it will continue to publish personal data every day at noon, and will stop if its demands are accepted. Asked about the authenticity of the statement, GMO Internet Group said it would refrain from commenting on individual matters | Yomiuri Shimbun Online (27 Oct, 13:15): https://news.yahoo.co.jp/articles/1ee8419ae44aad58464adb11d4a0ca32b9a9c059; Kyodo (27 Oct, 13:17): https://news.yahoo.co.jp/articles/21ce54e7458ee2f0d2bb701e6719b7e688573a1c |
| 27 Oct, 14:55 | Notice No. 11: the company says it has confirmed that the data of people who accessed the attacker’s site was obtained by the attacker, and asks anyone who did so to run a full antivirus scan. It asks people not to repost, share or link to the published material, and says it is preserving evidence and preparing disclosure requests and criminal complaints against malicious redistributors | GMO Notice No. 11: https://group.gmo/info/alert/2026102704/ |
| 27 Oct, 19:10 | Notice No. 12: a “GMO Cybercrime Eradication Bounty” is created, paying up to USD 1 million in total (reference conversion about 150 million yen) for concrete, verifiable information that materially contributes to identifying and arresting those involved or resolving the case. Submissions open at 12:00 on 28 October via a dedicated site (cybercrimebounty.gmo) and run until an arrest. Customers whose data is published receive a “special condolence payment” per category (basic data 10,000 yen; financial/authentication data 15,000 yen; sensitive data 25,000 yen; up to 3 million yen per publication), separate from the flat 5,000 yen of Notice No. 4 and from loss compensation | GMO Notice No. 12: https://group.gmo/info/alert/2026102705/; Impress Watch (27 Oct, 20:05): https://news.yahoo.co.jp/articles/f050b3acdb49f10b09d73c7a494cd36edda90be3 |
| 28 Oct, about 04:00 | GMO confirms that the domain of the attacker’s site (including mirrors) has been taken down (Notice No. 13, 28 Oct 11:00), describing it as the result of working with the relevant providers. Press reports say the US provider used by the attacker appears to have suspended the domain for terms-of-service violations, and that the Tokyo Metropolitan Police are investigating on suspicion of violating the Unauthorized Computer Access Law. GMO says it will move to take down any similar site and will pursue legal action, including criminal complaints, against malicious redistribution | GMO Notice No. 13: https://group.gmo/info/alert/20261028/; TBS NEWS DIG (28 Oct): https://news.yahoo.co.jp/articles/bfddd406ecea0646848b98c48564cef76efc849d; Business+IT (28 Oct): https://news.yahoo.co.jp/articles/ce46ff9ea9f456cc8e531d7c94fbf38c76f00145 |
| 28 Oct | On the Tokyo Stock Exchange, 9449 rebounds 165 yen (5.2%) to 3,324 yen, still 11.8% below 23 October | Yahoo! Finance Japan (28 Oct close) |
| 28 Oct, 03:35-03:36 (added 29 Oct) | On 29 Oct I checked the .store registry WHOIS and RDAP records. The attacker’s site, coronamng.store, and its mirror, designbuilder.store, were both registered through the US registrar Namecheap, on 31 and 27 August 2026 respectively, and both carry the status clientHold (a registrar-side hold: the domain is removed from the DNS zone and no longer resolves), set at 18:35-18:36 UTC on 27 October (03:35-03:36 JST on 28 October), matching the time at which GMO says it confirmed the takedown. DNS queries on the evening of 27 October still resolved both domains to the registrar’s hosting name servers and IP address; as of 29 October they do not resolve. The domains were registered about two months before the incident was disclosed (21 Oct). Neither resolves at present; as Notice No. 11 states, visitors’ data was being collected by the attacker on that site, so do not visit it even if a site under the same name reappears | WHOIS: whois.nic.store; RDAP: rdap.radix.host (both checked 2026-10-29) |
| Dated 27 Oct (reported 29 Oct) | Press reports that the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications had asked telecom industry bodies (four groups, according to the Yomiuri Shimbun) in a letter dated 27 October to block connections to the attacker’s site, citing the scale of the incident’s social impact and the prevention of secondary harm. The industry body called the request unprecedented; carriers have not said whether they implemented it. The relationship with the constitutional secrecy of communications is being debated | Nikkei (29 Oct): https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXZQOUA292570Z21C26A0000000/; Jiji Press (29 Oct): https://www.jiji.com/jc/article?k=2026102900531&g=eco; Yomiuri Shimbun Online (29 Oct): https://news.yahoo.co.jp/articles/d42d98febc80d88e3289c386f0fc68507777e129 |
| 28 Oct, 18:20 | Notice No. 14: the “GMO Cybercrime Eradication Bounty” site received 113 tips in the five hours after opening (as of 17:00 on 28 Oct). The count will be published on the site at 18:00 on weekdays until the perpetrators are arrested or placed on an international wanted list. A total of 20 warnings have been sent over X posts that spread the attacker’s site URL or its contents. Analysis of the devices collected so far shows no trace of malware infection or a ransomware attack | GMO Notice No. 14: https://group.gmo/info/alert/2026102802/ |
| 29 Oct, 12:40 | Notice No. 15: the group’s white-hat team has obtained, through its own investigation, what it considers strong leads to identifying the perpetrators, and will submit them to the police and other relevant bodies the same day. Tips to the bounty site: 270 (as of 11:30 on 29 Oct) | GMO Notice No. 15: https://group.gmo/info/alert/20261029/ |
| 29 Oct | On the Tokyo Stock Exchange, 9449 rises a further 53 yen (1.6%) to 3,377 yen, still 10.4% below 23 October | Yahoo! Finance Japan (29 Oct close) |
| 29 Oct, 20:50 (added 30 Oct) | Notice No. 16: tips to the “GMO Cybercrime Eradication Bounty” site: 113 cumulative (18:00 on 28 Oct), 321 (18:00 on 29 Oct, +208) and 428 (18:00 on 30 Oct, +107). The count is appended to the same page at 18:00 on weekdays (excluding public holidays). The company thanked those refraining from reposting and spreading the information, and said it will take legal action, including criminal complaints, against the attack and threats | GMO Notice No. 16: https://group.gmo/info/alert/2026102902/ |
| 30 Oct | Notice to customers (as of 15:30): GMO has begun contacting contract holders directly about how to receive the condolence payment and about the alternative service announced in Notice No. 4. The notice gives no restart date for the service | GMO (30 Oct): https://group.gmo/info/alert/20261030/ |
| 30 Oct | On the Tokyo Stock Exchange, 9449 reverses, falling 129 yen (3.8%) to 3,248 yen, 13.8% below 23 October. The Nikkei 225 also fell 2.1% | Yahoo! Finance Japan (30 Oct close) |
| 31 Oct | The Nikkei reports that GMO’s subsidiary GMO Cybersecurity by Ierae had called for a fundamental review of the service’s systems as early as April 2024; NHK, KSB and others reported the same on the basis of sources. The content of the warning and the measures taken afterwards had not been made public at that point. The same day it became known that GMO would hold its first press conference on the incident in Tokyo on 2 Nov | innovaTopia (1 Nov, a roundup of press reports): https://innovatopia.jp/cyber-security/cyber-security-news/119600/ / Asahi Shimbun (announcement of the conference): https://news.yahoo.co.jp/articles/55a8ae51d6190446654fd41cd1afb3698355d97e |
| 1 Nov | Kyodo News and NHK report that a site calling on victims to “share information” may have been prepared before GMO disclosed the incident on 21 Oct. According to an expert analysis, part of its source code and its structure resembled the site carrying the attacker’s claim, and both used the same US rental-server provider. It drew almost no visitors and has already been closed. The reports suggest the attacker side may have tried to gather victims to gain leverage in negotiations. As of the morning of 1 Nov, GMO had not mentioned this site in its notices | NHK (1 Nov, 00:08): https://news.web.nhk/newsweb/na/nd-20261031de69043 / innovaTopia (1 Nov, a roundup of the Kyodo report): https://innovatopia.jp/cyber-security/cyber-security-news/119600/ |
| 2 Nov | On the Tokyo Stock Exchange, 9449 falls 31 yen (1.0%) to 3,217 yen, 14.6% below 23 October and back near its 27 October close (16.2% below). 7177 falls 50 yen (4.7%) to 1,018 yen (9.8% below 23 October), and 4784 falls 15 yen to 407 yen (17.1% below), under its 27 October close of 409 yen. The press conference began after the close (15:30), so this close does not reflect what was said there | Yahoo! Finance Japan (2 Nov close) |
| 2 Nov, from 15:30 | GMO Internet Group holds its first press conference on the incident, in Tokyo (Masatoshi Kumagai, group representative, attended; the group CFO explained the pay cuts). According to press reports, Kumagai apologised for the damage to customers’ assets and acknowledged that in 2024 experts at a subsidiary had pointed out problems in the service’s systems, saying the company could not make use of the warning. According to the Nikkei, the warning had not been escalated under the company’s internal reporting criteria, and GMO carried out emergency maintenance four times in April and May 2024 without achieving a fundamental improvement. Kumagai named the company’s delayed response as the biggest problem and said the design should have emphasised resilience on the assumption of intrusion. He said no money has been or will be paid to criminals, and that no new leak has been confirmed since the attacker’s site was taken down (28 Oct). He declined to comment on the possible involvement of a North Korea-linked hacker group, saying it is under investigation. He also apologised for social-media posts that lacked consideration for victims (such as a smiling photo). The reports do not mention a restart date for the service | Nikkei (2 Nov, 15:09, updated 16:36): https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXZQOUC0235C0S6A101C2000000/ / Impress Watch (2 Nov, 15:58): https://www.watch.impress.co.jp/docs/news/2153150.html / Bengo4.com News (2 Nov, 16:05): https://news.yahoo.co.jp/articles/2706dac23eb82be00bcc501f465da5c85576d797 |
| 2 Nov | The board resolves to cut the pay of four executives, as a share of monthly pay: 30% for Masatoshi Kumagai (Representative Director, Group Representative, Chairman and President & CEO), 25% for the president of GMO Internet (who is also a group director), 20% for a group vice president and 20% for a group managing executive officer, each for three months from the December 2026 payment. For the three who also serve at GMO Internet, the cut applies to the pay GMO Internet pays. The events before the incident will be examined later; the cuts reflect the current assessment, and management responsibility will be reviewed again in light of the findings | GMO IR, “Notice on Reduction of Executive Compensation” (2 Nov 2026): https://ir.group.gmo/pdf/irlibrary/gmo_disclose_info20261102.pdf |
| By 6 Nov | Details of the loss-compensation application to be announced (planned) | GMO Notice No. 4 |
Notes:
- The amount demanded is reported differently: USD 50 million (about 8 billion yen) according to Kumagai’s blog and the company, and USD 1 million (about 160 million yen) in the deadline notice on the attacker’s site. The initial demand and a later deadline demand may differ. This article lists both with their sources and goes no further.
- Claims about the intrusion route or internal configuration contained in the statement of the party claiming to be the attacker are not covered here, because they are not published facts. The name of the attacker group is not given either, as it has not been confirmed by multiple outlets.
- The Minister for Financial Services has said that five FX firms reported customer losses believed to be related to this case (press reports). The firms and the individual users are not identified in this article.
- Several reports say the attacker got in during August and that GMO noticed on 20 Oct. Reports differ on the date of the intrusion (5 Aug in some, 20 Aug in others), so this article gives no date. Which vulnerability was used is not stated in GMO’s official documents (Notices No. 1 to 16, the 30 Oct notice and the IR release).
- The content of the 2 Nov press conference is not confirmed against any transcript or materials published by GMO; it rests on press reports (the Nikkei, Impress Watch and Bengo4.com News). The reports differ in detail, and some points (the four emergency maintenance sessions in April and May 2024, and the warning not having been escalated under internal criteria) come from the Nikkei alone. The questions and answers, the intrusion route, the restart date and the loss-compensation procedure will be added when they can be confirmed.
- On 2 Nov, GMO Registry sent registrars, the author included, a notice of “Emergency Network Maintenance” on 4 Nov, 13:00-18:00 JST. It covers the EPP, RDAP and Registrar Console of nine TLDs including .shop, .tokyo and .jp; the notice gives no reason and does not mention this incident. Neither the notice nor any published information shows a link to this incident, and this article does not connect them. The notice is read from a registrar’s side in a separate article: https://nkzw.jp/2026/11/02/gmo_registry_emergency_maintenance_notice_2026_en/
I captured the site’s DNS records, TLS certificate, HTTP headers and the screen of every page on 27 October 2026 and keep them together with a list of SHA-256 hashes (45 files in total). They are held for submission to the authorities and will not be published in this or any future article. The image below is the top page at the time of capture, fully redacted; it shows only that the record exists. The registration and suspension of the domains are recorded in the table above (the row for 28 Oct, 03:35-03:36). How to read that record (why it was the registrar that stopped the site) and my view as someone in the domain business are set out in a separate article, How the Attacker’s Site Was Taken Down: The clientHold Timestamp in WHOIS, and a View from the Domain Business.
Top page of the site of the party claiming to be the attacker (captured 27 Oct 2026). All text, images and names are redacted

2. Why this is existential for users
Automated FX trading keeps open positions around the clock. If the VPS stops, users can neither close positions nor adjust them, and any market move turns into a realized loss. That is the first thing users faced in this incident. The company explains the shutdown as a measure to contain the damage, but at that moment users are left unable to trade.
Next came the request to back up data, unplug the PC and power it off. For many people the PC connected to the service is also a tool for work and daily life. Being asked to switch it off means stopping part of one’s business or life, not just trading. Reports also describe employees visiting customers’ homes to take custody of devices. For the user, that means the PC leaves their hands.
The announced payment and compensation matter, but Notice No. 4 limits compensation to realized losses from unauthorized trades (trading losses and fees); losses from market moves and lost profits are excluded. The opportunity cost of positions that could not be managed, and the business downtime while the PC is off, fall outside that scope.
This is not specific to this case. In general, part of the cost of a breach is paid by users, in time and lost opportunity. Where prior investment fell short, users end up paying the difference.
3. Search suggestions
Search suggestions reflect what people are worried enough to search for. Using Egosaru (gstudio1.com, a bulk Google-suggestion collection tool), I am collecting the phrases that follow each GMO group brand name twice a day from 27 October. The question is which words (“unauthorized access”, “data leak”, “compensation”, “cancel”, “is it safe”) attach to which brand names, and in what order.
Figure 1. Incident-related suggestion counts, Google Trends, and relative share prices of 9449 and 7177 (23 Oct = 100)

As of this flash edition there is only the first collection run, 12:17–12:40 JST on 27 October (the baseline). In that run of Google suggestions (Japanese), incident-specific words were attached to the following brands:
- “GMO Internet Group”: “unauthorized access”, “data leak”, “share price fall reason”
- “GMO Internet”: “unauthorized access”, “leak”, “share price fall”
- “Onamae.com”: “ransomware”, “dangerous”, “is it safe”
- “GMO Click Securities”: “unauthorized access”, “full compensation”, “is it safe”
- “GMO Payment Gateway” and “GMO GlobalSign”: “leak”, “share price fall reason”
- “ConoHa”: “unauthorized access”
The name of the affected service itself (“Onamae.com Desktop Cloud”) had only 28 candidates and no incident-specific words. Meanwhile, group services not directly involved, such as GMO Click Securities, GMO Payment Gateway, GMO GlobalSign and ConoHa, carried “unauthorized access”, “leak” or “share price fall”. Whether those words were already attached before the incident cannot be judged from this baseline alone: for “GMO Coin” and “GMO Aozora Net Bank”, collected ahead of time on 24–25 October, “unauthorized access”, “data leak” and “dangerous” were already attached before the disclosure and were unchanged on 27 October. An “unauthorized access” suggestion therefore does not, by itself, mean an effect of this incident. Because the incident-word count (top panel of Figure 1) also includes everyday words such as “login” and “cancel”, read it as a change from the baseline, not as an absolute level. Two things are being watched:
- The incident concerns a single service, “Onamae.com Desktop Cloud”. Do anxiety words spread to “Onamae.com” as a whole, and then to the group name “GMO”?
- Do “is it safe” and “cancel” attach to unrelated group services (hosting, domains, payments, securities)? If so, anxiety words have spread beyond the scope of the incident to other services in the group (this is an indicator of attention, not an evaluation).
3-1. Breakdown of the collection run (Figure 2; run of 2 Nov, 09:00)
Figure 2. Breakdown of incident-word suggestions by brand and by word (run of 2 Nov, 09:00)

Aggregating the run of 2 November, 09:00 (Google, Japanese, plain brand-name seeds): of 6,670 candidates across 18 brands, 178 (2.7%) contained an incident word. By word: “share price” 64 (7 brands), “cancel” 57 (12 brands), “outage” 25 (10 brands), “refund” 9, “cannot log in” 6, “unauthorized access” 6 (6 brands), “data leak” 3, “is it safe” 3, “dangerous” 2, “switch provider” 2, “compensation” 1 and “ransomware” 1 (a candidate containing two words is counted under each; the stacked bars on the left of Figure 2 assign each candidate to one category, so they sum to 178). The first run (27 Oct, 12:17) had 6,701 candidates and 177 incident-word candidates; in the run of 27 Oct, 21:00 “Muumuu Domain unauthorized access” and additional cancellation-related candidates for “Onamae.com” appeared, bringing the count to 179, and in the run of 1 Nov, 21:00 “GMO Aozora Net Bank cancellation method” disappeared, bringing it to 178.
Three points on how to read it. First, the most frequent word, “share price”, is attached to the names of the listed companies, led by GMO Internet (29), and reflects attention drawn by the share-price fall itself. Second, “cancel” and “outage” are everyday words for hosting and domain brands (ConoHa, Lolipop, Muumuu Domain, Onamae.com), and this baseline alone cannot separate them from any effect of the incident. Third, incident-specific words (unauthorized access, data leak, ransomware, compensation, is it safe, dangerous) total 16, just under a tenth of the whole, and none is attached to the name of the affected service itself (“Onamae.com Desktop Cloud”). The highest shares of incident-word candidates are GMO Internet (6.2%) and GMO Financial Holdings (6.0%), both driven by “share price”. This breakdown is the baseline against which later runs will be read: how the count and the number of brands for incident-specific words move.
The second collection run, at 21:00 on 27 October (961 jobs, no failures), returned Google suggestions (Japanese) almost identical to the first (12:17). The brands carrying incident-specific words, and the words themselves, did not change; the only additions were one suggestion, “Muumuu Domain unauthorized access”, and some cancellation-related candidates for “Onamae.com” (“server service cancel”, “net de diagnosis cancel”, “cancel domain”). The third run, at 09:00 on 28 October (961 jobs, no failures), was identical to the 21:00 run: incident-word candidates stayed at 179. Even across the attacker’s publication (27 Oct, afternoon) and the takedown of the attacker’s site (early 28 Oct), the next morning’s suggestions did not move. The fourth run (28 Oct, 21:00) and the fifth (29 Oct, 09:00) were identical again: incident-word candidates stayed at 179. The five later runs (29 Oct 21:00, 30 Oct 21:00 (only one run that day), 31 Oct 09:00, 31 Oct 21:00 and 1 Nov 09:00) were identical too. In the eleventh run (1 Nov, 21:00) one candidate, “GMO Aozora Net Bank cancellation method”, disappeared, bringing the count to 178, and the twelfth (2 Nov, 09:00) also had 178. The one that disappeared is a “cancellation method” query unrelated to this incident, and the 16 incident-specific candidates (unauthorized access, data leak, ransomware, compensation, is it safe, dangerous) have not moved at all. Neither the opening of the bounty (28 Oct), the submission of leads to the police (29 Oct), the 30 Oct notice to customers, nor anything else published before the morning of 2 Nov shows up in the suggestions (the 2 Nov press conference came after that run). Figure 2 is redrawn from the 2 November 09:00 run, and the diamonds in Figure 1 show the same values.
In the Google Trends panel of Figure 1 (Japan; relative values with the 90-day maximum set to 100; the 90 days are re-fetched at every update, so the scale changes each time), search interest in “GMO Internet” rose after the 24 October disclosure, peaked at 100 on the deadline day, 27 October, and then fell to 21 on 28 October, 9 on 29 October, 5 on 30 October, 3 on 31 October and 5 on 1 November, slightly above its level before the disclosure (2 on 20 October); “Onamae.com” peaked at 35 on 27 October, fell from 28 October on, and was at 1 on 1 November. Lolipop shows a separate peak on 22 October, before the disclosure; no relation to this incident can be confirmed. Data for 2 November was still being tallied when retrieved (15:45) and is not plotted in Figure 1 (the day of the press conference; it will be covered once the figure is final).
Suggestions indicate attention, not facts. A “cancel” suggestion does not mean cancellations increased. This caveat will be repeated every time the chart is updated.
4. Share prices
| Stock | Close on 23 Oct (last trading day before Notice No. 4) | Close on 26 Oct (first trading day after Notice No. 4) | Close on 27 Oct | Close on 28 Oct | Close on 29 Oct | Close on 30 Oct | Close on 2 Nov | Change vs 23 Oct (2 Nov) | Volume (26 → 27 → 28 → 29 → 30 Oct → 2 Nov) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 9449 GMO Internet Group | 3,769 yen | 3,179 yen (−15.7%) | 3,159 yen (−16.2%) | 3,324 yen (−11.8%) | 3,377 yen (−10.4%) | 3,248 yen (−13.8%) | 3,217 yen | −552 yen (−14.6%) | 3.86M → 5.92M → 3.64M → 2.59M → 1.32M → 0.81M shares (3.2× → 4.9× → 3.0× → 2.1× → 1.1× → 0.7× the 23 Oct volume) |
| 7177 GMO Financial Holdings | 1,128 yen | 1,045 yen (−7.4%) | 1,046 yen (−7.3%) | 1,079 yen (−4.3%) | 1,082 yen (−4.1%) | 1,068 yen (−5.3%) | 1,018 yen | −110 yen (−9.8%) | 2.25M → 0.92M → 0.75M → 0.39M → 0.42M → 0.84M shares |
| 4784 GMO Internet | 491 yen | 418 yen (−14.9%) | 409 yen (−16.7%) | 423 yen (−13.8%) | 433 yen (−11.8%) | 422 yen (−14.1%) | 407 yen | −84 yen (−17.1%) | 8.47M → 7.25M → 5.47M → 5.36M → 2.76M → 3.13M shares |
Sources: Yahoo! Finance Japan (daily data for each stock, checked after the close on 2026-11-02). On 27 October, 9449 recovered in the morning, fell to a low of 3,040 yen in the afternoon and closed at 3,159 yen (−0.63% on the day). On 28 October, after the takedown of the attacker’s site became known, 9449 rebounded 165 yen (5.2%) to 3,324 yen, and on 29 October it rose a further 53 yen (1.6%) to 3,377 yen. On 30 October, however, it fell back 129 yen (3.8%) to 3,248 yen, and on 2 November it closed 31 yen (1.0%) lower at 3,217 yen. Most of the rebound of 28 and 29 October was gone within two trading days, and the fall from 23 October, at 14.6%, is back near the 16.2% of 27 October. On 2 November 7177 fell 50 yen (4.7%) to 1,018 yen, on volume about twice that of 30 October (0.84M shares), and 4784 fell on both 30 October and 2 November to 407 yen, below its 27 October close (409 yen). The reasons cannot be confirmed from public information. Volume in 9449 has dropped to 0.7 times its 23 October level, so trading has thinned. The Nikkei 225 fell 2.1% on 30 October and 0.3% on 2 November and is 0.6% above 23 October. The press conference began after the close (15:30) on 2 November, so that day’s close does not reflect what was said there. The next trading day is 4 November (3 November is a public holiday), the first after the conference.
Figure 3. Change in market capitalization of listed group companies vs 23 Oct

On the 2 November close, the market capitalization of 9449 was down about 51.4 billion yen (14.7%) from 23 October, 7177 about 13.0 billion yen (9.8%), 4784 (GMO Internet) about 25.6 billion yen (17.1%) and 3769 (GMO Payment Gateway) about 20.4 billion yen (3.1%) (shares outstanding from Yahoo Finance; treasury shares not taken into account). The simple total for eight listed group companies (9449, 7177, 3769, 3633, 3788, 4051, 6180, 4784) is about 121.5 billion yen (8.7%) down, or about 96.0 billion yen (7.7%) excluding 4784. Compared with the 27 October close (eight companies about 126.1 billion yen, 9.0% down), the decline, which the rebounds of 28 and 29 October had cut to about 60%, has widened again to about 96% of that after the falls of 30 October and 2 November. 3788 (GMO GlobalSign Holdings) alone fell 13.6% on 2 November and is 20.6% below 23 October; the reason cannot be confirmed from public information, so its relation to the incident cannot be separated. Market capitalizations of the parent (9449) and listed subsidiaries (such as 4784) overlap, so the total is not adjusted for ownership. Figure 3 uses the same close-based values (3695 is excluded because its company name could not be confirmed).
That the parent company’s share price fell 15.7% from 23 October on the first trading day after Notice No. 4, closed 16.2% below that level again on 27 October, and, after two days of rebound on 28 and 29 October, fell back on 30 October and 2 November to 14.6% below it, is a matter of public record. The figure includes the movement of the market as a whole and does not isolate the effect of the incident. Selling also reached the holding company of the group’s FX businesses (7177); the reason cannot be confirmed from public information.
A rough calculation of the flat payment from public figures only: 5,000 yen multiplied by the 26,739 potentially affected servers, as an upper bound, is about 134 million yen. The value lost in the share price decline is of a different order. The point is not that the compensation is small. In general, the cost of a breach can show up far more in lost enterprise value than in the compensation paid.
This article is not investment advice. Share prices are treated as a record of what happened; no trading recommendation or forecast is made.
5. In general: what happens when security investment is deferred
The rest of this section leaves the present case and sets out what past cases and existing rules say in general. The cause of the present case has not been disclosed, and nothing below is applied to it.
Figure 4. General pattern: how deferred security investment can cascade (not a description of any specific incident)

5-1. A change in trust shows up in search behaviour within days
In past incidents, anxiety words attached to brand searches within days of disclosure, changing the character of searches for the brand. For this case, section 3 will track the data and this article will be updated when it is available.
5-2. The size of what comes after
- Benesse (Japan, 2014): After a leak of customer data, the company booked an extraordinary loss of 26 billion yen (20 billion yen for compensation and 6 billion yen for investigation and countermeasures) and posted a net loss for April–June 2014. The vice chairman and the CIO resigned (source: ScanNetSecurity, 2014-08-01, https://scan.netsecurity.ne.jp/article/2014/08/01/34611.html; and 2015-02-10).
- Equifax (US, 2017): Data on about 147 million people was exposed. In 2019 the company agreed to a global settlement with the FTC, the CFPB and 50 states and territories of at least USD 575 million and up to USD 700 million (source: FTC press release, 2019-07-22, https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2019/07/equifax-pay-575-million-part-settlement-ftc-cfpb-states-related-2017-data-breach).
- Colonial Pipeline (US, 2021): Ransomware halted the fuel pipeline serving the US East Coast. The CEO testified before the Senate that the company had paid a ransom worth about USD 4.4 million (source: AP, 2021-06-08, https://www.bangordailynews.com/2021/06/08/nation/pipeline-ceo-defends-paying-ransom-amid-cyberattack/).
The amounts incurred after the fact are as above. A comparison with the cost of prior countermeasures cannot be made from public information, but the size of the after-the-fact amounts is common to all three.
5-3. Shareholder litigation and directors’ responsibility
In Japan, directors owe a duty of care under Article 423 of the Companies Act, and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry’s Cybersecurity Management Guidelines call for the board to oversee cybersecurity as a management issue. The Financial Services Agency’s supervisory guidelines likewise treat system-risk management as a responsibility of senior management. In the US, the SEC introduced disclosure rules for material cyber incidents in 2023. In Japan and abroad, cybersecurity is positioned as a matter for the board, not only for the technical department.
5-4. Constraints on users, and their unfairness
Even when compensation arrives, the lost opportunity of positions that could not be managed does not come back. A request to “please switch off your PC” is one form of the price users pay, in time and opportunity, when the cost of countermeasures is deferred. That social cost does not appear on the operator’s income statement.
6. What operators and executives can do now (general; based on public guidelines)
- Put a reporting line for cyber risk into the board. Each quarter, the board receives the list of open findings and the reasoning behind their priority.
- Give security findings a deadline. For findings from internal or external specialists, decide not “whether” but “by when, and to what depth”; findings past their deadline go on the agenda of the management meeting.
- Check the basics. Separation of privileged accounts and multi-factor authentication, restriction of remote-access routes, reliable deletion of environments and credentials after use ends, isolated backups, log monitoring. All of these appear in METI and IPA guidelines and apply to any operator.
- Design user communication for incidents in advance. Decide what to tell users, when, and through which channel. When asking users to act, attach an explanation that matches the burden being asked of them.
- Check how your site looks from the outside. The versions and security headers a server announces can be checked by anyone. In my “Security Exposure Survey 2026” (https://sitescouter.net/en/articles/security-exposure-statistics-2026), Japanese sites ranked last among 10 regions on all eight security controls.
7. Limits and caveats
- This article is based only on public information (GMO’s notices, Kumagai’s blog, press reports, share prices, search suggestions). The intrusion route and cause await the official investigation report.
- Claims made by the party claiming to be the attacker are unverified and are not treated as facts here.
- Search suggestions indicate attention, not facts or cancellation numbers.
- Share prices include the effect of the overall market and do not isolate the incident.
- The affected FX firms and individual users are not identified.
8. Closing: put someone in charge who answers for the outcome
In his blog post of 25 October, Kumagai explained that internal white-hat hackers had flagged improvement items in advance, that the operations team had weighed availability and other priorities, and that the depth and speed of the response were insufficient (source: https://www.kumagai.com/?eid=19600). The structure in which security findings compete for priority with availability, revenue and deadlines exists at every operator. The price of that judgement grows with the time between the finding and the fix.
As a general matter, what is missing is not findings. It is an executive who takes the findings on board, decides the priority between availability and safety, and answers for the result. Listed companies need an executive responsible for information systems (a CIO) and an executive responsible for security (a CISO), so that it is clear who answers for the outcome. My superior has long proposed this; the present case shows why it is needed. Without such executives, the same pattern will repeat at any listed company.
Appendix: Primary sources, as captured on 27 October 2026
Published pages are sometimes revised, moved or removed later, so full-page screenshots of the primary sources this article relies on were saved as displayed on 27 October 2026. The source URL and capture date are given above each image. The pages are in Japanese.
Primary source 1. GMO Internet Group, Report 2 (published 22 Oct 2026)
Source: https://group.gmo/info/alert/20261022/ / Captured: 27 Oct 2026

Primary source 2. GMO Internet Group, Report 4 (published 24 Oct 2026)
Source: https://group.gmo/info/alert/20261024/ / Captured: 27 Oct 2026

Primary source 3. GMO Internet Group, notice (published 25 Oct 2026)
Source: https://group.gmo/info/alert/20261025/ / Captured: 27 Oct 2026

Primary source 4. Onamae.com, Report 1 (published 21 Oct 2026)
Source: https://www.onamae.com/news/article/11584 / Captured: 27 Oct 2026

Primary source 5. Masatoshi Kumagai’s blog (published 25 Oct 2026)
Source: https://www.kumagai.com/?eid=19600 / Captured: 27 Oct 2026

Disclosure
The author was previously at a GMO group subsidiary and held shares in the group at one time, but currently has no relationship with the group and holds no shares. The author is, however, a current customer of ConoHa VPS, a GMO group service. It is a different service from the one affected, and no impact on ConoHa has been announced, but as someone whose work runs on the same group’s infrastructure, the author is not free of concern. This article is based solely on public information, and no information obtained during that employment has been used. It is not investment advice but part of the author’s effort to share information about security.
About the author and contact
Yuki Nakazawa (nkzw.jp), Japan.
- Official site: nkzw.jp
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- LinkedIn: yukinakazawa
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- Telegram: @yknkzw
2026.10.27 / written by Yuki Nakazawa
Update history
- 1st edition (flash) published: October 27, 2026 12:38 JST
- 2nd edition updated: October 27, 2026 12:40 JST (flash edition)
- 3rd edition updated: October 27, 2026 12:41 JST (flash edition)
- 4th edition updated: October 27, 2026 12:50 JST (flash edition)
- 5th edition updated: October 27, 2026 14:21 JST (flash edition)
- 6th edition updated: October 27, 2026 14:22 JST (flash edition)
- 7th edition updated: October 27, 2026 17:12 JST (27 Oct close reflected)
- 8th edition updated: October 27, 2026 19:02 JST (27 Oct close reflected)
- 9th edition updated: October 27, 2026 19:02 JST (27 Oct close reflected)
- 10th edition updated: October 27, 2026 19:05 JST (Figures 1 and 3 replaced with close-based versions)
- 11th edition updated: October 27, 2026 20:52 JST (Figure 2 (suggestion breakdown) added; ConoHa VPS use added to the disclosure)
- 12th edition updated: October 27, 2026 21:13 JST (second suggestion run (21:00) reflected: almost unchanged)
- 13th edition updated: October 28, 2026 17:01 JST (daily update for 28 Oct: Notices No. 9-13, site takedown and bounty added; prices and figures through the 28 Oct close)
- 14th edition updated: October 28, 2026 23:01 JST (links to the Site Scouter and Egosaru editions added)
- 15th edition updated: October 29, 2026 1:19 JST (section 1 adds the WHOIS / RDAP findings on the two attacker-site domains (registration dates, registrar, clientHold timestamps))
- 16th edition updated: October 29, 2026 1:20 JST (the two attacker-site domain names are now given in the WHOIS row of section 1)
- 17th edition updated: October 29, 2026 1:48 JST (the end of section 1 adds the fully redacted top page of the attacker site and a note on the preserved record)
- 18th edition updated: October 29, 2026 2:07 JST (the end of section 1 adds a reference to the separate article on the domain takedown)
- 19th edition updated: October 29, 2026 17:04 JST (daily update for 29 Oct: Notices No. 14-15 and the 29 Oct prices added; table and Figures 1-3 updated to 29 Oct)
- 20th edition updated: November 2, 2026 17:05 JST (update for 2 Nov (30 Oct to 2 Nov reflected together: Notice No. 16, 30 Oct notice, press conference, pay cuts, share prices, Figures 1-3))

